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The Energy Wealth of Indian Nations 
Shawn E. Regan∗ 
Terry L. Anderson∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Economists have long sought to explain why some nations are 
rich while others are poor.1 Although the recipe for growth remains 
a matter of debate, most agree that secure property rights and a 
stable rule of law are necessary ingredients for economic growth.2 
Property rights provide incentives to generate wealth, encourage 
resource stewardship, and form the basis for market exchanges. A 
stable rule of law promotes long-term investment by reducing the 
cost of engaging in market exchange and encouraging capital 
accumulation.  
The importance of the institutions of property rights and the 
rule of law is evident in American Indian reservations.3 Crossing 
into reservations, especially in the western United States, reveals 
islands of poverty in a sea of wealth. Per capita income for 
American Indians living on reservations is about half that of other 
United States citizens.4 Thirty-nine percent of Indians live in 
poverty, compared with nine percent of white Americans, and 
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 1. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Roy Harold Campbell & Andrew S. Skinner eds., 
1976) (1776); DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: 
THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012).  
 2. See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 1. 
 3. See Terry L. Anderson & Dominic P. Parker, Sovereignty, Credible 
Commitments, and Economic Prosperity on American Indian Reservations, 51 J. 
LAW & ECON. 641, 646 (2008). 
 4. See 2006-2010 American Community Survey Selected Population 
Tables, AM. FACTFINDER, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf 
/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, archived at http://perma.cc/9C7C-QZ9R. 
See also HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 
THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF 
SELF-DETERMINATION 114-16 (2008) [hereinafter HARVARD PROJECT]. 
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Indian unemployment is almost four times higher than the United 
States average.5 
This Article discusses the effects of the institutions and 
regulations that restrict energy development on tribal lands. It 
posits that economic development could be realized in Indian 
Country if tribes and individual Indians had more secure property 
rights and greater ability to control their own natural resources. 
The Article then proceeds by providing a background of 
reservation land tenure and the institutions governing tribal energy 
development. Next, the Article describes existing energy 
development on Indian reservations and examines the untapped 
energy potential on Indian lands. The discussion section of this 
Article suggests that the institutions governing Indian lands, along 
with the additional regulations that apply to tribal energy 
development, act to suppress energy-related economic growth on 
Indian lands by limiting opportunities for tribes to capitalize on 
their energy resources. This Article concludes by suggesting that in 
order to develop their natural resources, tribes living on Indian 
reservations must be granted the same rights and institutions as 
those living elsewhere. 
I. THE POTENTIAL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND THE OBSTACLES IN THE 
PATH 
A. Land of Plenty: Abundance of Energy Resources on American 
Indian Property 
Low incomes exist on Indian reservations despite the fact that 
many reservations contain considerable natural resources, 
particularly energy resources.6 Reservations contain almost 30% of 
the nation’s coal reserves west of the Mississippi, 50% of potential 
uranium reserves, and 20% of known oil and gas reserves.7 The 
Department of the Interior (DOI) estimates that 15 million acres of 
potential energy and mineral resources are undeveloped on Indian 
lands while only 2.1 million acres of Indian land are being tapped 
for their energy resources.8 According to one study, the Crow 
                                                                                                             
 5. HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 4, at 114. See also Maura Grogan, 
Native American Lands and Natural Resource Development, REVENUE WATCH 
INST. 6 (2011), http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/RWI 
_Native_American_Lands_2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7C62-MJD5. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 3–7. 
 8. Indian Energy Development: Hearing before the Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, United States Senate, 110th Cong. 42 (2008) [hereinafter IED Hearing] 
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Reservation in Montana contains coal and other assets valued at 
nearly $27 billion, approximately $3.3 million per tribal member, 
making the tribe one of the largest coal owners in the world.9 
Despite such energy wealth, the tribe’s annual rate of return on 
coal assets is a mere 0.01%.10 The tribe has reported 
unemployment rates as high as 78%.11 Similarly, the Fort Berthold 
reservation in North Dakota sits atop one of the nation’s largest oil 
and gas plays, but the development of resources on the reservation 
is slower than off the reservation.12 Simply put, energy resources 
on Indian lands are substantial. The potential wealth that could be 
derived from such resources presents an opportunity for significant 
economic growth for both American Indians and the United States 
economy.13 
B. Economic Growth in American Indian Communities 
Given this natural resource wealth, why do Indian reservations 
remain poor? This Article posits that the answer has to do with the 
structure of the economic and legal institutions on reservations.14 
Abundant natural resources are neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for economic growth. What matters for economic 
growth, both in general and on reservations, are institutions that 
determine whether human capital, physical capital, and natural 
                                                                                                             
 
(statement of Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and 
Economic Development).  
 9. Stephen Cornell & Joseph Kalt, Where’s the Glue? Institutional and 
Cultural Foundations of American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. SOCIO-
ECONOMICS 443, 444 (2000). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Sierra Crane-Murdoch, The Other Bakken Boom: A Tribe Atop the 
Nation’s Biggest Oil Play, PERC Case Study (Nov. 28, 2012), http://perc.org 
/articles/other-bakken-boom, archived at http://perma.cc/J43-9TAD. 
 13. Opportunities to develop renewable energy resources also exist on 
Indian reservations. See, e.g., Resources, ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/indian 
energy/resources, archived at http://perma.cc/YHR2-HZ3Y (last visited Oct. 7, 
2014) (citing National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and the 
Department of the Interior) (estimating that, in addition to conventional fossil 
fuel energy resources, Indian lands have the potential to produce 14 billion 
megawatt-hours (MWh) rural utility-scale solar resources, 1.1 billion MWh 
wind resources, 7 million MWh hydropower resources, 5 million MWh 
geothermal (hydrothermal) resources, and 4 million MWh biomass (solids) 
resources). 
 14. We use the term “institutions” following Douglass C. North, 
Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1991) (“Institutions are the humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction.”). 
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resources are used efficiently.15 In their search for the factors that 
promote economic growth on reservations, authors Cornell and 
Kalt explained that “a tribe’s resources can be wasted or go 
untapped unless that tribe can establish an incentive environment 
that channels them into productive ends.”16 Similarly, authors 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson concluded that “countries with 
better ‘institutions,’ more secure property rights, and less 
distortionary policies will invest more in physical and human 
capital, and will use these factors more efficiently to achieve a 
greater level of income.”17  
The complex history of the federal government’s relationship 
with American Indians has largely denied tribes the institutional 
attributes that promote widespread economic growth.18 
Crossing a reservation boundary often means entering an entirely 
different set of legal institutions, including property rights and the 
rule of law. Outside reservations, local, county, state, and federal 
governments provide relatively stable property rights through law 
enforcement and judicial institutions conducive to economic 
growth.19 Inside reservations, however, legal jurisdictions and land 
tenure can vary widely, resulting in a complicated mosaic of 
property ownership. This mosaic consists of lands held in trust by 
the United States government on behalf of tribes, lands held in 
trust by the federal government on behalf of individual Indians, 
and fee-simple lands located within reservation boundaries.20 
                                                                                                             
 15. Id. See Cornell & Kalt, supra note 9, at 467 (“Generous resource 
endowments, human capital, and access to financial capital will be virtually 
useless if tribes . . . lack the institutional structures necessary to maintain a 
hospitable environment for human and financial investment.”). See also Ian 
Keay & Cherie Metcalf, Property Rights, Resource Access, and Long-Run 
Growth, 8 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 792, 829 (2011) (examining the effect 
of secure aboriginal property rights to natural resources on long-run 
macroeconomic growth in Canada).  
 16. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 9, at 446. 
 17. Daron Acemoglu, et. al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1369 
(2001) (emphasis in original). 
 18. See Anderson & Parker, supra note 3, at 641. The history of the federal 
government trusteeship of Indian lands is discussed in greater detail later in the 
article. 
 19. Id. 
 20. The various forms of land tenure found on reservations are discussed 
infra. See Marsha A. Goetting & Kristin Ruppel, Planning for the Passing of 
Reservation Lands to Future Generatons: How Reservation Land is Owned by 
Individuals, AIRPRA FACTSHEET 3 (Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.indiancountry 
extension.org/sites/indiancountryextension.org/files/publications/files/u6/AIPR
A%20factsheet3.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YCU8-NLET (providing a 
detailed description of how reservation land is owned by individuals).  
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Navigating this complex system of land ownership makes both 
energy development and economic growth difficult on many 
reservations.21 In addition, the federal government’s trust authority 
over Indian lands has often prevented tribes from fully capitalizing 
on their natural resource wealth. Authors Anderson and Lueck, for 
example, found that agricultural productivity on Indian lands held 
in trust by the federal government was significantly less than on 
similar fee-simple lands on reservations.22 
Regarding energy resources, at least four federal agencies are 
involved in the execution of any energy lease on tribal lands.23 
Until the 1970s, tribes could not negotiate the terms for energy 
leases on their lands, and to this day, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) remains responsible for approving and overseeing energy 
development on Indian trust land.24 Not only does the BIA’s trust 
authority raise the cost of energy development on Indian lands, but 
it also has a long history of not living up to its fiduciary 
responsibility of managing Indian trust funds, as evidenced by the 
1996 class-action suit Cobell v. Salazar. In Cobell, petitioners 
alleged that the United States government incorrectly accounted 
for income from trust assets belonging to Indian landowners. 25 The 
case settled in 2009 with the federal government agreeing to pay 
individual Indians and tribes $3.4 billion.26  
To make matters worse, tribes often have difficulty attracting 
investment for energy development on reservations if they misuse 
their sovereign powers to tax or employ eminent domain. 27 Tribal 
                                                                                                             
 21. See Shawn Regan, Unlocking the Energy Wealth of Indian Nations: 
Overcoming Obstacles to Tribal Energy Development, 1 PERC POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE 7–8, 10 (2014), http://perc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/IndianPolicy 
Series%20HIGH.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VY57-MXH3. 
 22. Terry L. Anderson & Dean Lueck, Land Tenure and Agricultural 
Productivity on Indian Reservations, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 427–54 (1992). 
 23. Grogan, supra note 5, at 18–22. The four agencies involved with 
decision-making, revenue flows, and oversight of energy development on Indian 
lands include at least the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Land 
Management, the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (formerly the Minerals 
Management Service), and Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians. 
A fifth federal agency, the Office of Surface Mining, is involved when coal 
resources are extracted on Indian lands. 
 24. Id. at 13. 
 25. Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  
 26. Patrick Reis, Obama Admin Strikes $3.4B Deal in Indian Trust Lawsuit, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/12/08/08green 
wire-obama-admin-strikes-34b-deal-in-indian-trust-l-92369.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/VJ6P-R9SP. 
 27. See David D. Haddock, Foreseeing Confiscation by the Sovereign: 
Lessons from the American West, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
AMERICAN WEST (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1994). See also David 
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sovereignty can be an asset when it places control over energy 
development in the hands of tribal members because it ensures that 
the tribe has a larger stake in the outcome. However, tribal 
sovereignty can also be a liability if it makes the rule of law on 
reservations less certain.28 Tribal governments, like all sovereign 
nations, face the dilemma of whether to promote institutions that 
create a climate for investment based on the rule of law or to 
pursue policies with short-term benefits by taking profits and 
property rights from investors.  
Several court cases involving takings of property by tribes have 
caused investment concerns throughout Indian Country.29 If 
investors believe tribal governments could abuse their sovereign 
powers to take a larger share of profits from economic 
development projects, such abuse can stifle private investment on 
reservations.30 These reputational effects may extend to tribal 
                                                                                                             
 
D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Sovereignty Can be a Liability: How Tribes Can 
Mitigate the Sovereign’s Paradox, in SELF-DETERMINATION: THE OTHER PATH 
FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 194–213 (Terry L. Anderson, et al. eds., 2006). 
 28. Id. 
 29. The Jicarilla Apache tribe in Arizona, for example, faced this dilemma 
when it began negotiating with petroleum companies to explore and produce oil 
and gas on its reservation. The contracts provided for royalty payments to the 
tribe of 12.5%. In 1976, after the companies had made significant investments in 
infrastructure, the tribe added a severance tax, taking the total rate to nearly 
20%. The companies took the tribe to court, contending that only state and local 
authorities had the ability to tax mineral rights on Indian reservations. The 
companies eventually lost the argument when the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed 
the tribe’s sovereign power to tax. See generally Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
 30. The Hualapai tribe recently became embroiled in a dispute after 
contracting with a developer to invest nearly $30 million to build a tourist 
attraction known as the “Skywalk.” The clear, horseshoe-shaped glass walkway, 
jutting 70 feet out from the rim of the Grand Canyon, opened in 2007 and by 
2013 had attracted 1.4 million visitors with the potential to generate an 
estimated $100 million over the next two decades. Arguing that the developer 
did not deliver on his end of the bargain, the tribe used its eminent domain 
power to take the property without compensation. The developer took the tribe 
to federal court where in 2013, U.S. District Judge David Campbell ruled in 
favor of the developer saying that the tribe had “clearly waived its sovereign 
immunity” and that its legal arguments were “odd,” “nonsensical,” and “wholly 
unconvincing.” Louise Benson, chairwoman of the tribe when the Skywalk 
contract was signed, said current tribal leaders are “giving the Hualapai a 
terrible reputation that will injure the tribe for years.” See Dennis Wagner, 
Grand Canyon Skywalk Judgment Could Devastate Tribe, USA TODAY, (Feb. 
19, 2013, 8:11 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/19 
/grand-canyon-skywalk-judgment-tribe/1929813/, archived at http://perma.cc 
/J7PV-7HCN.  
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efforts to develop energy resources, which often require significant 
amounts of private investment from outside the reservation.  
II. RESERVATION LAND TENURE AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
Understanding the evolution of reservation land tenure is 
important for understanding resource extraction on Indian lands. A 
brief history of American Indian land ownership and its impact on 
resource extraction helps explain the complicated relationship that 
exists between tribes and the federal government. 
A. The Evolution of the Federal Trust Doctrine 
The doctrine of federal trust responsibility that defines the 
relationship between the federal government and tribes traces its 
roots to Supreme Court decisions in the early 1800s.31 Chief 
Justice Marshall described tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” 
unable to negotiate treaties with foreign nations, but implying that 
they retained the power to govern themselves.32 Marshall went on 
to state that Indians “are in a state of pupilage” and characterized 
their relationship with the United States as resembling “that of a 
ward to his guardian.”33 From this conception, the federal 
government became the trustee for Indian lands. This trust 
relationship between Indians and the federal government, which 
continues today, extends to surface and subsurface resources.34 
Therefore, although tribal sovereignty implied the right for Indians 
to govern themselves, it did not grant tribes complete autonomy to 
devise their own property rights and governance structures.35 Two 
                                                                                                             
 31. The following three cases, often referred to as the Marshall Trilogy, 
established the doctrine of federal trust responsibility: Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823) (finding that Indians have rights to occupy 
lands but do not have rights to own land); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 
1 (1831) (denying the Cherokee Nation’s claim that they were a foreign nation); 
Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (finding that the Cherokee 
Nation was a distinct community within which the laws of the State of Georgia 
could have no force). 
 32. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 
 33. Id.  
 34. See generally Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian 
Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L. 
J. 541, 545 (1993) (noting that “the surface and subsurface estates of Indian 
country may be unified in one owner or split, but the permutations are 
complex”). 
 35. See Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and 
the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1065, 1068–69 (2008); STEPHEN CORNELL & JOSEPH P. KALT, 
TWO APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON AMERICAN INDIAN 
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centuries later, the trust doctrine requires any energy development 
taking place on tribal lands to be authorized by the federal 
government.36 
The government’s characterization of Indians as “wards” was 
codified with the General Allotment Act of 1887, also known as 
the Dawes Act.37 Under the Act, many Indian lands were allotted 
to individual Indians, but the lands were held in trust until the 
Secretary of the Interior deemed the allottee “competent and 
capable of managing his or her own affairs.”38 Other lands were 
considered surplus land and opened to homesteading by non-
Indians.39 Once Indian allottees were declared competent, their 
allotments were removed from federal trust restrictions and fee-
simple title was granted.40 These titles gave owners the right to 
manage their land as they saw fit, including the right to sell the 
land.  
The allotment era ended in 1934 with the passage of the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA).41 The Act virtually froze the remaining 
Indian lands in trust status for which fee-simple title had not been 
granted prior to 1934.42 Lands released from trusteeship prior to 
reorganization remain in fee-simple title, giving owners autonomy 
over land-use decisions within the limits of the law.43 Released 
lands can be sold, encumbered as collateral for loans, or leased for 
                                                                                                             
 
RESERVATIONS: ONE WORKS, THE OTHER DOESN’T (2006), available at 
http://nni.arizona.edu/resources/inpp/2005-02_jopna__Two_Approaches.pdf,  
archived at http://perma.cc/C4RQ-H8TX; Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, 
Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for Economic Development on 
American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO? STRATEGIES AND 
INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 8 (Stephen 
Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992) (distinguishing between “political 
sovereignty” and “practical sovereignty”).  
 36. See Royster, supra note 34, at 1074–81. 
 37. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (repealed 2000). 
 38. Burke Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 182 (amending § 6 of the General Allotment 
Act) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349). In 1917, allottees with less than one-half 
Indian blood were considered competent and were issued fee-simple titles to 
their lands, thereby removing the federal trust restrictions and allowing the 
allottee to sell the land. In 1920, however, this policy of automatically deeming 
allottees competent based on blood quantum was abolished. See Judith V. 
Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 11 (1995). 
 39. See Royster, supra note 38. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 461-495). 
 42. Grogan, supra note 5, at 11. 
 43. See Goetting & Ruppel, supra note 20 (describing how reservation land 
is owned). 
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energy development without the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior.44 In contrast, individual trust lands and tribal trust lands 
are subject to BIA control.45 The BIA can grant or deny permission 
to lease or develop tribal resources.46 Individual and tribal trust 
lands cannot be sold and generally cannot be encumbered as 
collateral in the capital market.47 To compound the complexity, 
individual trust lands have often been passed in undivided interest 
to Indian heirs.48 After several generations, ownership can become 
so fractionated that hundreds of heirs exist, all of whom must agree 
on how land is used.49  
B. The Impact of Trusteeship on Energy Development  
The combination of the Dawes Act, the IRA, and sales to non-
Indian owners has left a complicated mosaic of land tenure on 
reservations including fee-simple, individual trust (also known as 
allotted), and tribal trust lands. This mosaic extends to the 
subsurface as well, where ownership of mineral rights occasionally 
differs from ownership of the surface.50 Across Indian Country, 
                                                                                                             
 44. See Grogan, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 15. 
 47. Id. at 11. 
 48. See Jake Russ & Thomas Stratmann, Creeping Normalcy: Fractionation 
of Indian Land Ownership (George Mason Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper 
No. 13-28, 2013). 
 49. Id.  The problem of fractionated Indian ownership increases 
exponentially with each passing generation, meaning the problem only gets 
worse as time passes. The federal recordkeeping costs also increase as 
fractionation continues. In 1992, the GAO estimated the BIA’s annual 
recordkeeping costs for twelve reservations with fractionated ownership were 
between $40 and $50 million. By 2010, these costs had increased to $246 
million per year due to increased fractionation. See Michael A. Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 685–87 (1998) (on the problem of the anticommons). 
Today, there are 156, 596 individual Indian land allotments and more than 4.7 
million fractionated interests. See also Report of the Commission on Indian Trust 
Administration and Reform, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (Dec. 10, 2013), http: 
//www.doi.gov/cobell/commission/upload/Report-of-the-Commission-on-Indian 
-Trust-Administration-and-Reform_FINAL_Approved-12-10-2013.pdf,  
archived at http://perma.cc/8R9S-UMQ6. 
 50. For example, see CROW INDIAN RESERVATION, NATURAL, SOCIO-
ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT AND CONDITIONS REPORT 
(2002), available at http://www.blm.gov/mt/st/en/fo/miles_city_field_office/og 
_eis/crow.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3D39-B42B. This report was 
intended for use with the Montana Statewide Revised Draft/Final Oil and Gas 
Environmental Impact Statement and Amendments of the Powder River and 
Billings Resource Management Plan (Jan. 2002). For further discussion, see 
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75% of surface rights are tribal trust land, 20 percent are individual 
trust land, and 5% are fee-simple land.51 
Other federal statutes further complicate energy development 
on Indian trust lands. Under legislation passed in 1891, trust lands 
can be leased for grazing or mineral development.52 Initially, 
leasing required tribal consent for resource extraction, but 
Congress removed the consent requirement in 1919 for certain 
mineral leases in the West.53 Subsequently, energy development 
occurred on reservations through a leasing process controlled 
almost entirely by the federal government.54 The Indian Mineral 
Leasing Act (IMLA) of 1938 attempted to revitalize tribal 
governments by restoring some tribal control over energy 
development decisions.55 The Act established a standardized 
mineral leasing system and set minimum rates for rents and 
royalties.56 In practice, however, tribal control was limited. The 
IMLA granted tribes “the key right to consent before leasing could 
occur,” but allowed them “no say in the mining process once they 
authorized the leasing of their lands, and no right to certain 
cancellation” for breach of contract.57 Lease terms, including 
royalty amounts and other payments, were decided on and 
enforced by the BIA and the United States Geological Survey 
(USGS).58 Both agencies have consistently undervalued Indian 
                                                                                                             
 
Terry L. Anderson & Dominic P. Parker, The Wealth of Indian Nations: 
Economic Performance and Institutions on Reservations, in SELF 
DETERMINATION: THE OTHER PATH FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 159–193 (Terry L. 
Anderson et al. eds., 2006). 
 51. See Terry Anderson & Dominic Parker, Un-American Reservations, 
DEFINING IDEAS: A HOOVER INSTITUTION JOURNAL (Feb. 24, 2011), http: 
//www.hoover.org/research/un-american-reservations, archived at http://perma 
.cc/77BP-EAAE.  
 52. 25 U.S.C. § 397 (2012). 
 53. 25 U.S.C. § 399. See Royster, supra note 34, at 1072. Tribal consent 
was not required in the act of 1919, but several statutes in 1924 and 1927 did 
require consent. 25 U.S.C. § 398–398a. 
 54. Grogan, supra note 5, at 13; MARJANE AMBLER, BREAKING THE IRON 
BONDS: INDIAN CONTROL OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 14 (1990). During the 
early era of energy development on Indian lands “the federal government was 
entirely in charge—of what resources could be developed, for what length of 
time, and under what circumstances.” See Royster, supra note 34, at 1072. 
 55. 25 U.S.C. § 396a2–396g. 
 56. Royster, supra note 35, at 1073–74. 
 57. Royster, supra note 34, at 565. 
 58. Id. 
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resources and, by all accounts, done a poor job of negotiating lease 
terms and collecting royalties on behalf of tribes.59  
During the 1970s and 1980s, tribes were afforded a more active 
role in energy development decisions on reservations. In 1982, for 
instance, the Indian Mineral Development Act (IMDA) was 
enacted, which eventually allowed tribes (but not individual 
allottees) to enter into any type of energy extraction agreement 
they desired.60 The Act also allowed lease terms and royalty 
amounts to be determined by tribes rather than the federal 
agencies.61 The IMDA represented a positive step towards tribal 
self-determination. Under the Act, tribes can negotiate leases, joint 
ventures, production sharing, or other agreements to develop 
resources.62  
C. Limitations on Tribal Autonomy in Energy Development 
Today, IMDA agreements are the primary means by which 
tribes lease lands for energy development.63 Nonetheless, the 
federal trusteeship of Indian lands limits opportunities for tribal 
resource development and self-determination. The BIA and other 
federal agencies are required to oversee and approve all 
development agreements on Indian lands, adding layers of 
regulations and bureaucracy to tribal resource development 
projects.64 Tribes must acquire approval from the Secretary of the 
Interior for each specific lease or agreement, a process that is 
notoriously slow and cumbersome.65 
In 2005, Congress passed the Indian Tribal Energy 
Development and Self-Determination Act to further promote tribal 
                                                                                                             
 59. The American Indian Policy Review Commission concluded in 1977 
that “the leases negotiated on behalf of Indians are among the poorest 
agreements ever made.” AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, 95TH CONG., 
92–185, FINAL REP. 339 (1977). The federal government incorrectly accounted 
for income from trust assets belonging to Indian landowners, as examined in 
Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 60. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108 (2012). Final regulations to implement the 
IMDA were not promulgated until much later. The IMDA finally became 
effective in 1994. See Royster, supra note 34, at 584 n.281. 
 61. Royster, supra note 34, at 585–88. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Grogan, supra note 5, at 15. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Royster, supra note 35, at 1077 n.69 (noting that an IMDA 
agreement on Fort Berthold took “over three years,” and citing testimony from a 
Crow member noting “an extremely slow BIA approval process”). 
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self-determination.66 The Act authorizes tribes to create Tribal 
Energy Resource Agreements (TERAs) that would afford tribes 
much greater control over energy development decisions. Once a 
TERA is approved, tribes would no longer need to receive separate 
approval for each business arrangement the tribes make in order to 
undertake resource development.67 Thus far, no tribe has entered 
into a TERA because, as one observer notes, “the rules and 
regulations around implementing a TERA are exceedingly 
complex.”68 
III. ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS 
A. Available Energy Resources 
American Indian reservations make up nearly 56 million acres, 
or about 2.3% of the total United States land base.69 The DOI 
estimates energy exploration and development has taken place on 
2.1 million acres in Indian Country, while another 15 million acres 
with energy and mineral resources are undeveloped.70 In other 
words, 88% of Indian lands with energy or mineral potential 
remain untapped. Of course, energy resources are not evenly 
distributed among Indian lands. Reservations in the western United 
States contain most of the energy wealth of Indian nations.71 
Energy tribes, as they are often called, “receive a significant 
portion of their income from energy minerals or . . . own 
substantial undeveloped reserves.”72 
 
                                                                                                             
 66. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3506 (2012). Final federal regulations took effect on 
April 9, 2008. See Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the Indian Tribal 
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 25 C.F.R. 224 (2014). 
 67. These business arrangements include “[a]ny permit, contract, joint 
venture, option, or other agreement that furthers any activity related to locating, 
producing, transporting, or marketing energy resources on tribal land.” 25 
C.F.R. § 224.30 (2014). 
 68. Grogan, supra note 5, at 16. 
 69. The Department of the Interior is responsible for managing 56 million 
surface acres and 57 million acres of subsurface mineral estates. See Report of 
the Commission on Indian Trust Administration and Reform, supra note 49, at 
16. 
 70. IED Hearing, supra note 8, at 42 (statement of Dr. Robert W. 
Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of the 
Interior). 
 71. Grogan, supra note 5, at 29. 
 72. AMBLER, supra note 54, at 3. 
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TABLE 1 SELECT MAJOR ENERGY RESOURCE TRIBES73 
 
State Tribe Resources 
AZ Hopi C, O, G 
Navajo C, O, G, U 
CO Southern Ute C, O, G 
Ute Mountain C, O, G, U 
MT 
Blackfeet C, O, G 
Crow C, O, G
Assiniboine and Sioux (Fort Peck) C, O, G
Northern Cheyenne C, O
NM Jicarilla Apache C, O, G 
ND Three Affiliated (Fort Berthold) C, O, G 
OK Osage O, G 
UT Uintah and Ouray Ute C, O, G, OS 
WY Arapahoe and Shoshone (Wind River) C, O, G, U 
C – Coal, O – Oil, G – Gas, OS – Oil Shale, U – Uranium 
 
Technological advancements in energy extraction add to the 
potential energy wealth of Indian nations. Extensive shale oil and 
gas reserves that lay beneath many reservations are now accessible 
with improvements in the hydraulic fracturing process. For 
instance, the Fort Berthold reservation sits above the Bakken oil 
field in North Dakota where in 2013 the USGS estimated there are 
7.4 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 6.7 trillion cubic feet of 
technically recoverable natural gas.74 These estimates represent a 
                                                                                                             
 73. Grogan, supra note 5, at 29. 
 74. STEPHANIE B. GASWIRTH ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL 
RESOURCES IN THE BAKKEN AND THREE FORKS FORMATIONS, WILLISTON BASIN 
PROVINCE, MONTANA, NORTH DAKOTA, AND SOUTH DAKOTA, 2013 (2013) 
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2013/3013/fs2013-3013.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/R6BV-XTDX (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
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doubling and tripling, respectively, of previous government 
estimates.75 
B. Challenges to Tapping into Available Resources 
Several factors create challenges for the development of tribal 
energy resources. First, as explained above, federal trusteeship of 
Indian lands and other laws make it difficult for individual Indians 
or tribes to capitalize on their energy resources.76 Second, the 
uncertain structure of tribal legal institutions increases the cost and 
risk of doing business on reservations, making it difficult for tribes 
to attract outside investors.77 Finally, federal laws put decisions 
regarding land use and energy development in the hands of 
agencies that have a less than stellar record for managing resources 
in a way that maximizes the welfare of Indians.78 
The economic costs of these factors are felt particularly by the 
Three Affiliated Tribes on the Fort Berthold reservation. Although 
the tribes are located at the center of the boom in United States 
shale oil and gas development, Fort Berthold is largely missing out 
on the economic growth experienced beyond its borders.79 On 
Indian lands, companies must go through four federal agencies and 
forty-nine regulatory or administrative steps to acquire a permit to 
drill, compared with only four steps when drilling off reservation.80 
The effect of these additional constraints on Indian lands is to raise 
the cost to energy companies of entering into resource 
development agreements with tribes or tribal members.81 When 
development does occur, it often generates a lower return for the 
tribes and individual Indians due to additional bureaucratic and 
regulatory obstacles.82 Lease payments to mineral owners are often 
higher off the reservation lands, leading many tribal members on 
Fort Berthold to question why they are not able to take full 
advantage of the energy boom occurring around them.83 
                                                                                                             
 75. Id. In addition to coal, oil, and natural gas, tribes also have significant 
sources of oil shale, uranium, copper, and rare earth minerals. The focus of this 
article, however, is on coal, oil, and natural gas. 
 76. For a discussion of the obstacles to Indian energy development, see 
Regan, supra note 21. 
 77. Id. at 13. 
 78. Id. at 11–13. 
 79. Crane-Murdoch, supra note 12. 
 80. Id. at 3. 
 81. Id. at 2. 
 82. Id. See Grogan, supra note 5, at 18–28. 
 83. Crane-Murdoch, supra note 12, at 3. 
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It is not uncommon for several years to pass before the 
necessary approvals are acquired to begin energy development on 
Indian lands—a process that takes only a few months on private 
lands.84 At any time during the energy development process, a 
federal agency may demand more information or shut down 
development activity.85 Development projects on Indians lands are 
subject to significantly more constraints than similar projects on 
private lands.86 Simply completing title search requests results in 
delays from the BIA. Indians have waited six years to receive title 
search reports that other Americans can get in a few days.87  
Despite such challenges, energy resources are the largest 
revenue generator in Indian Country.88 On the Fort Berthold 
reservation alone, oil and gas development generated more than 
$40 million per month in revenue for the affiliated tribes in 2013.89 
Throughout Indian Country, tribes and individual Indian mineral 
owners earned more than $932 million in royalty revenue from oil, 
gas, and minerals in 2013.90 The BIA expects Indian royalty 
income to exceed $1 billion in 2014.91 Nonetheless, these returns 
look paltry when compared with the potential value of energy 
resources that could be developed on Indian lands. 
                                                                                                             
 84. Grogan, supra note 5, at 20 n.31. 
 85. Id. at 26. 
 86. These constraints include environmental and cultural resource reviews, 
a $6,500 fee to the Bureau of Land Management for processing an application to 
drill on Indian lands, and a mismanaged system of land ownership records. See 
id. 
 87. ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 110 (2012). 
 88. See Oil and Gas Outlook in Indian Country, BUREAU OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 1, http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xieed 
/documents/document/idc1-024535.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GRJ3-
UM7L (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
 89. James MacPherson, ND Tax Accord Nets $40M Monthly for Tribe, 
State, PRAIRIE BUS. MAGAZINE (Dec. 9, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://www.prairie 
bizmag.com/event/article/id/17039/, archived at http://perma .cc/FNG6-7R2M. 
 90. Summary of ONRR Fiscal Year 2013 Disbursements, DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR (2013), http://www.onrr.gov/About/PDFDocs/11-13-DOI-Summary 
DisbursementsData.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S79H-C2VC. This amount 
represents an increase of more than $200 million over the previous year’s total. 
The Office of Natural Resource Revenue attributes this increase largely to 
additional oil development on the Fort Berthold reservation in North Dakota. 
See Interior Department Disbursed $14.2 Billion in 2013 Energy Revenues to 
Benefit Federal, State, Local and Tribal Governments, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 
(Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.onrr.gov/About/PDFDocs/20131119a.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/A62F-9L8B. 
 91. Oil and Gas Outlook in Indian Country, supra note 88. 
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IV. POTENTIAL ENERGY RESOURCES ON INDIAN LAND 
Like all estimates of unrecovered energy resources, precise 
measures of recoverable energy resources in Indian Country are a 
matter of debate for many reasons. First, technological 
advancements in resource extraction, such as recent improvement 
in the hydraulic fracturing process, can render previous estimates 
of unrecovered resources obsolete by increasing the amount of 
resources that are technically recoverable. Second, the value of 
unrecovered resources continually change as prices change, 
affecting whether the costs of exploration and development exceed 
the expected value of the resource. Third, estimates of mineral 
resources require knowledge about the quantity and quality of 
resources that can be several miles beneath the earth’s surface—
knowledge that cannot be truly known until the resources are fully 
explored.92 These factors, combined with the fact that there is often 
less development and exploration on reservations, make it difficult 
to know what resource potential actually exists below Indian lands.  
A. Estimation: How Much Energy is Available? 
Such challenges, however, have not stopped the federal 
government from attempting to estimate the availability of Indian 
energy resources.93 A 1976 report by the General Accounting 
Office found that, although exact amounts of such resources are 
unknown, approximately 4.2 billion barrels of oil and about 17.5 
trillion cubic feet of gas existed on 40 Indian reservations in 17 
states.94 At the time, the USGS estimated that Indian oil and gas 
reserves amounted to three percent of the nation’s total reserves.95 
The same USGS report also estimated coal resources on Indian 
land at 1,581 billion tons, or 7% to 13% of the nation’s coal 
                                                                                                             
 92. See GASWIRTH ET AL., supra note 74 (representing a doubling and 
tripling of previous estimates of the oil and gas resources beneath the Bakken 
and Three Forks formations, respectively). 
 93. Government efforts to estimate Indian energy resources began in the 
1970s along with federal policies of self-determination such as the Indian 
Mineral Development Act that allowed tribes more say in energy development 
decisions. Such policies, to the extent that they increased domestic energy 
production, were also consistent with national goals of energy independence in 
the wake of the 1973 oil embargo. See Royster, supra note 34, at 584. 
 94. Report from the Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. General 
Accounting Office, to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. 
Senate, Indian Natural Resources—Part II: Coal, Oil, and Gas: Better 
Management Can Improve Development and Increase Indian Income and 
Employment 1-2 (Mar. 31, 1976). 
 95. Id. at 2. 
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resources.96 The report concluded that, given such resource wealth, 
“[m]ineral resources development on reservations can thus provide 
substantial income and employment opportunities to the Indians.”97 
The DOI has specific estimates of energy potential publicly 
available for several reservations.98 Although the reports were 
issued in the 1970s, and are therefore based on earlier 
understandings of the minerals beneath Indian lands, they illustrate 
the extent of energy wealth beneath Indian reservations. For 
example, the DOI concluded in 1975 that the Crow Reservation 
(13,260 enrolled tribal members) has 17 billion tons of coal and 40 
million barrels of oil that remain undeveloped.99 According to a 
similar report, the neighboring Northern Cheyenne Reservation 
(10,500 enrolled tribal members) has even more: 23 billion tons of 
undeveloped coal and 270 million barrels of undeveloped oil—
almost all of which remains undeveloped today.100  
B. Valuation: How Much is the Energy on Indian Lands Really 
Worth? 
In 2008, the DOI estimated that Indian lands “contain over 5 
billion barrels of oil, 37 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 53 
billion tons of coal that are technically recoverable with current 
technologies.”101 The DOI stated that the combined value of these 
                                                                                                             
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. The Department of the Interior issued a series of reports on the status of 
mineral resources on Indian lands in the 1970s. See Fossil Fuel Resources, 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/tribalenergy/guide/fossil_fuel_resources.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/86E6-T8KR (last updated July, 15, 2013).  
 99. W. J. MAPEL ET AL., U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, STATUS OF MINERAL 
RESOURCE INFORMATION FOR THE CROW INDIAN RESERVATION, MONTANA 14, 
31 (1975). For tribal population, see also Crow Reservation: Demographic and 
Economic Information, STATE OF MONT. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS 4 (2013), http://www.ourfactsyourfuture.org/admin/uploadedPubli 
cations/2685_Crow_RF08_Web.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V7VB-N2BV. 
 100. W. P. MAPEL ET AL., U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, STATUS OF MINERAL 
RESOURCE INFORMATION FOR THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE INDIAN RESERVATION, 
MONTANA 1, 35 (1975). The Northern Cheyenne tribe has largely opted not to 
pursue energy development on its lands, a decision that remains a contentious 
issue within the tribe. See Grogan, supra note 5, at 36. See also Northern 
Cheyenne Reservation: Demographic and Economic Information STATE OF 
MONTANA GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS ET AL., 4 (2013), http: 
//www.ourfactsyourfuture.org/admin/uploadedPublications/2694_N_Cheyenne 
RF08_web.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CJ7L-3VYM (listing tribal 
population). 
 101. IED Hearing, supra note 8. 
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resources at that time was $875 billion.102 Using the latest census 
data, which estimates that there are 5.2 million people in the 
United States that self-identify as American Indian or Alaska 
Native alone or in combination with one or more other races,103 the 
per capita value of the energy wealth on Indian lands amounts to 
approximately $170,000.104 More recently, the DOI has reiterated 
similar estimates, asserting in 2012 that Indian lands have the 
potential to produce 5.35 billion barrels of oil, 37.7 trillion cubic 
feet of conventional natural gas, and 53 billion tons of coal.105  
Using a recent spot price for coal in the Powder River Basin, 
the Crow Reservation’s coal reserve is worth $210 billion, and the 
Northern Cheyenne’s coal reserve is worth $284 billion.106 Given a 
recent spot price for West Texas Intermediate crude oil, the Crow 
Reservation’s oil reserves are worth $3.8 billion, and the Northern 
Cheyenne’s oil reserves are worth $25.9 billion.107 Both 
reservations have yet to develop significant amounts of their coal 
or oil resources.108 In 2009, the secretary of the Council of Energy 
Resource Tribes, a tribal energy consortium, estimated that at 
existing prices, the present-day value of energy resources on Indian 
                                                                                                             
 102. Id. 
 103. See Tina Norris et al., The American Indian and Alaska Native 
Population: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1 (Jan. 2012), http://www.census.gov 
/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WL7V-ZFFD. 
 104. It is not clear from the DOI estimate how the $875 billion figure was 
derived or whether it is in present discounted value terms. If the per-capita 
calculations were limited to American Indians and Alaska Natives that reside in 
American Indian areas, then the per-capita value of energy resources on Indians 
lands would be much higher. The U.S. Census estimates approximately 1 
million American Indians and Alaska Natives reside in Indian areas, suggesting 
a per-capita value of energy resources of approximately $875,000. See id. at 13–
14. 
 105. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF INDIAN ENERGY, BRIEFING FOR THE 
SENATE ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE AND THE SENATE 
INDIAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (2012). 
 106. Coal News and Markets Report, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/coal/news_markets/archive/, archived at http://perma.cc 
/FC32-NPSR (last visited Oct. 7, 2014) (listing coal price of $12.35/ton as of 
Jan. 31, 2014). These values assume that each tribe’s energy reserves remain as 
they were at the time of the DOI’s original inventory. Although this assumption 
may not hold in many cases, tribes such as the Northern Cheyenne have yet to 
develop their coal reserves. See Cornell & Kalt, supra note 9 (estimating the 
Crow’s coal assets to be worth $27 billion using more recent estimates of 
resource availability from the Crow tribe). 
 107. Petroleum & Other Liquids: Spot Prices, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=D  
(last updated Sept. 17, 2014) (listing oil price of $92.82/barrel for WTI crude as 
of Jan. 27, 2014). 
 108. Grogan, supra note 5, at 32, 36. 
2014] THE ENERGY WEALTH OF INDIAN NATIONS 213 
 
 
 
lands amounted to nearly $1.5 trillion.109 This estimate implies a 
potential per capita energy value of $290,000 for American 
Indians.110 This amount starkly contrasts with United States 
Census data estimating the per capita income of American Indians 
and Alaska Natives to be $16,964.111  
Although Indian lands contain tremendous energy wealth, most 
tribes are not generating significant returns on their assets. In 2013, 
energy resources earned tribal mineral owners $932 million in 
royalty revenue.112 Using the more recent estimate of $1.5 trillion 
worth of undeveloped energy resources on Indian lands, the current 
annual return is less than seven ten-thousandths of a percent on 
tribal energy assets. 
V. ENERGY REGULATIONS AND TRIBAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
In addition to the complicated bureaucracy that oversees tribal 
energy projects, other local, state, and federal regulations can make 
it difficult for many tribes to capitalize on their vast energy 
resources. In 2013, the Crow tribe in Montana received approval 
from the BIA to lease 1.4 billion tons of coal on their reservation to 
a Wyoming energy company.113 The project has the potential to 
generate a source of long-term revenue for the tribe, but a host of 
regulations are making the reliability of this revenue source 
uncertain.114 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
announced plans in 2013 to issue strict limits on emissions from 
new coal-fired power plants, and the agency is planning more 
regulations for existing coal plants.115 The regulations are 
                                                                                                             
 109. Indian Energy and Energy Efficiency: Hearing before the S. Comm. On 
Indian Affairs, 111th Cong., 12 (2009) (statement of Hon. Marcus Levings, 
Chairman, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation). 
 110. Including only American Indians and Alaska Natives that reside in 
American Indian areas, this estimate implies a per-capita value of approximately 
$1.5 million. See Norris et al., supra note 103 at 13–14. 
 111. 2008-2012 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, Table 
B19301C - Per Capita Income In The Past 12 Months (In 2012 Inflation-
Adjusted Dollars) (American Indian And Alaska Native Alone), U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, available at http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages 
/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_12_1YR_B19301C&prodType=table, archived 
at http://perma.cc/NX3J-VWG3. 
 112. See Summary of ONRR Fiscal Year 2013 Disbursements, supra note 90. 
 113. Matthew Brown, Feds Approve 1.4B-Ton Coal Deal with Crow Tribe, 
BILLINGS GAZETTE (June 20, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://billingsgazette.com 
/business/feds-approve-b-ton-coal-deal-with-crow-tribe/article_911af76d-874f- 
5307-bd23-4db984b4050c.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G8QE-SKJL. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Lenny Bernstein & Juliet Eilperin, EPA Moves to Limit Emissions of 
Future Coal- and Gas-Fired Power Plants, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2013, at A18. 
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considered tough enough to make it difficult—and possibly cost-
prohibitive—to build any new coal plants in the United States.116 
A. Local Barriers 
With the domestic market for coal dwindling, the tribe and its 
development partners are planning to export the Crow’s coal to 
international markets, a prospect that depends in part on the 
construction of proposed coal export facilities in Oregon and 
Washington.117 However, several cities near the proposed 
terminals and along the rail routes are trying to stop coal exports, 
citing concerns about traffic congestion, quality of life, and climate 
change.118 Cities as far away as Missoula, Montana—more than 
500 miles from the proposed terminals—have petitioned the Army 
Corps of Engineers to expand the scope of its environmental 
assessment of coastal terminals.119 The city council of Missoula, 
Montana, for example, wants the Army Corps to conduct a 
comprehensive environmental impact statement that would 
evaluate consider the environmental impacts of coal-rail shipments 
in Missoula and the increased carbon and mercury emissions once 
the coal is burned.120 
Crow tribal chairman Darrin Old Coyote opposes the cities’ 
attempts to stop the approval of the export terminals.121 In a letter 
to the city council of Missoula, Montana, Old Coyote wrote:  
Today, the Crow Tribe has a rare window of opportunity 
before it, and we are doing everything in our power to take 
advantage of it before that window closes . . . . For the 
Crow people, there are no jobs that compare to a coal job—
                                                                                                             
 116. Id. 
 117. Manuel Quiñones, Sagging Domestic Market has Mont. Mine, Tribe 
Rolling Dice on Exports, GREENWIRE (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.eenews.net 
/stories/1059987299, archived at http://perma.cc/9Q8C-BZJY. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Missoula, Mont. City Council. Resolution No. 7829 (2013), available at 
http://mt-missoula2.civicplus.com/DocumentCenter/View/23402, archived at 
http://perma.cc/GWJ4-2PYW. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Darrin Old Coyote, Coal Development Rare Opportunity for the Crow 
Tribe, MISSOULIAN (Oct. 21, 2013, 8:15 AM), http://missoulian.com/news 
/opinion/columnists/coal-development-rare-opportunity-for-the-crow-tribe  
/article_cc331a46-3a53-11e3-b8ad-001a4bcf887a.html, archived at http://perma 
.cc/6GZ6-DZVD. 
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the wages and benefits exceed anything else that is 
available.122 
 
Old Coyote believes the city’s actions will delay, and could 
possibly halt, the construction of the facilities necessary to 
export the tribe’s coal resources.123  
B. Federal Hurdles 
Beyond regulations associated with the emissions or the 
transportation of tribal energy resources, development projects on 
tribal lands are subject to a number of federal regulations that do 
not apply on private lands.124 Some of these regulations are the 
result of the complex morass of agencies tasked with overseeing 
Indian energy development, as discussed earlier, while others 
result from the general application of federal land management 
laws to Indian lands. 125 For instance, like any federal development 
project, all tribal energy projects must go through National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review as well as cultural 
resource review under the National Historic Preservation Act 
(NHPA).126 Both requirements add to the complexity of energy 
development on Indian lands, and neither requirement applies to 
development projects on private lands.127 
Stoney Anketell of the Fort Peck tribe recently noted the 
frustration that such requirements can impose on tribal energy 
projects.128 At a meeting in 2013 with several United States 
senators, Anketell explained how the delays associated with 
archaeological assessments are impairing oil and gas development 
on the tribe’s reservation in eastern Montana,129 stating “[I]t takes 
                                                                                                             
 122. Id. Old Coyote has also remarked that “the war on coal is a war on our 
families and our children.” See Terry L. Anderson & Shawn Regan, The War on 
Coal Is Punishing Indian Country, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2013, at A11. 
 123. Old Coyote, supra note 121. See also Lynne Peeples, Coal-Hungry 
World Brings Tough Choices for Native Americans, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 
2014, 9:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/30/northwest-coal-
exports_n_4611021.html, archived at http://perma.cc/N8H7-SBTZ (noting how 
other tribes in the Pacific Northwest’s mounted vocal campaigns in opposition 
to the construction of the terminals over concerns about local impacts to cultural 
sites, air quality, and waterways). 
 124. Grogan, supra note 5, at 22. 
 125. Such agencies include the BIA, BLM, ONRR, and OSM. See Grogan, 
supra note 5. 
 126. Grogan, supra note 5, at 22. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Anderson & Regan, supra note 122. 
 129. Id. 
216 JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 3 
 
 
 
too long to get leases approved, to get lease assignments approved, 
to get rights of way approved.”130 Describing how such regulations 
often work in practice, Anketell remarked, “We’re not 
shortchanging the need for archaeological reviews, but on land that 
has been farmed for seventy years? It’s been tilled, plowed, 
planted, harvested. There’s no teepee rings.”131 Likewise, Ron 
Crossguns of the Blackfeet tribe’s Oil and Gas Department 
recently expressed frustration to a documentary filmmaker over the 
effects of energy regulations on the tribe’s efforts to develop its 
resources.132 “It’s our right. We say yes or no,” said Crossguns. “I 
don’t think the outside world should come out here and dictate to 
us what we should do with our properties.”133 
Tribes are also affected by federal energy regulations in ways 
that other sovereign nations are not. Tribal nations, unlike other 
developing nations throughout the world, must pursue energy 
development within the broader regulatory context of the United 
States, which treats development projects on tribal lands much like 
those on federal lands.134 Many of these regulations, including the 
NEPA and NHPA review processes, are often identified by tribes 
as significant obstacles to energy development.135 In addition, the 
transportation of tribal energy resources to market is governed 
entirely by a federal regulatory structure that can determine the 
success or failure of tribal energy projects.136 Other nations in the 
developing world are not subject to the broader regulations of an 
unequal and more powerful sovereign in the same manner as the 
relationship between Indians and the United States government.137 
                                                                                                             
 130. Aaron Flint, Ft. Peck Reservation: Feds Hindering Oil Development, 
FLINT REPORT (Sept. 10, 2013, 4:03 PM), http://www.northernbroadcasting 
.com/Talk/FlintReportHeadlines/tabid/519/ID/9803/Ft-Peck-Reservation-Feds- 
Hindering-Oil-Development.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/Q29H-K425. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Rebecca Centeno, A Conversation with Ron Crossguns, Blackfeet Oil 
and Gas Department, YOUTUBE (2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=KFFxmUfI2mk, archived at http://perma.cc/DL33-YLRL. 
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VI. SUCCESS STORIES IN TRIBAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
Despite the challenges discussed above, several tribes have 
succeeded in developing their energy resources for the benefit of 
their tribal communities. In particular, these tribes have succeeded 
by asserting their right to self-determination and by taking a more 
active role in the resource development process. 
The Southern Ute tribe in Colorado has arguably experienced 
the most success at developing its energy resources.138 The tribe 
owns and operates five energy companies and invests much of its 
energy revenues into its Growth Fund, which is estimated to be 
worth $4 billion.139 Today, the tribe’s 1,400 members are each 
worth millions on paper and receive dividends every year from the 
fund.140 The tribe’s expertise in energy development extends far 
beyond the reservation’s borders. Red Willow Production 
Company, a tribal-owned energy company, is engaged in oil, gas, 
and coal-bed methane extraction throughout the western United 
States, as well as offshore oil production in the Gulf of Mexico.141 
The Southern Ute tribe’s success began, perhaps surprisingly, 
after it declared a moratorium on issuing new energy leases in 
1974.142 The tribal council recognized that the DOI failed to 
negotiate appropriate compensation for leases on the reservation.143 
The tribe also lacked the expertise needed to make informed 
decisions about energy development projects.144 Following the 
moratorium, the tribe contracted with outside experts to map and 
interpret the extent of its undeveloped resources.145 In the process, 
the tribe not only learned the value of their energy resources but 
also just how much the federal government had undervalued 
them.146 After the tribe lifted the moratorium, it continued to 
consult with outside experts to guide energy development 
decisions on the reservation.147 The tribe contracted with attorneys, 
auditors, petroleum geologists, and others to take advantage of 
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changes in federal policy that allowed tribes to negotiate their own 
energy leases.148 The tribe was also awarded several court 
settlements for the historic federal mismanagement of tribal assets 
and used the funds to create Red Willow Energy, its first energy 
business.149 By operating its own energy companies, the Southern 
Ute Tribe established an expertise in resource development and a 
reputation for good business practices and management.150 
The tribe’s approach to energy development is consistent with 
tribal values of self-determination. The tribe conducts its own 
audits and operates a land division that is adept at navigating the 
complex layers of federal agencies that oversee energy projects.151 
Revenues from energy development enable the tribe to pay for 
government and social services.152 The tribal-owned energy 
companies are able to take advantage of their exemption from 
many of the taxes non-Indian operators must pay. The tribal 
government has also made efforts to separate politics from 
business, enabling tribal companies to make their own business 
decisions.153 
Like the Southern Ute, other tribes are asserting control over 
their natural resources by purchasing and operating more aspects 
of the energy development process. In 2013, the Navajo Nation 
purchased the Navajo Mine, the sole provider of coal to New 
Mexico’s Four Corners Generating Station, from its previous non-
Indian owner, BHP Billiton.154 The mine has provided jobs to 
hundreds of tribal members and generates $41 million annually for 
the Navajo’s general fund.155 The tribe’s sovereign status will 
afford it a lower tax burden, allowing the tribe to operate the mine 
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more profitably than BHP Billiton.156 Similarly, in 2012, the Three 
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold received initial approval from 
the Secretary of the Interior to construct on their reservation in 
North Dakota the first new United States refinery in more than 30 
years.157 If completed, the refinery would process 13,000 barrels of 
crude oil per day from the Bakken formation for the domestic 
market and would ensure continued energy-related employment 
and economic opportunities for the affiliated tribes.158 
Beyond energy resources, tribes have demonstrated that when 
they are afforded more control over natural resource management, 
the result is often better management and higher output.159 In the 
1990s, the Salish-Kootenai Confederated Tribes on Montana's 
Flathead Reservation took over more than 100 programs previously 
run by federal agencies, including forestry management.160 The 
tribes now earn $2.04 for every dollar they spend on timber 
management, while the neighboring Lolo National Forest, managed 
by the federal government, receives only $1.11 for every dollar it 
spends.161 More recently, the Salish-Kootenai tribe is looking to 
purchase a dam on the reservation, thereby becoming the nation’s 
first tribal hydroelectric owners and operators.162 
VII. POLICY REFORMS TO PROMOTE TRIBAL CONTROL OVER 
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
Several policy reforms can help tribes take more control of 
their energy resources, and if they choose to do so, allow tribes to 
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harness institutional attributes that support energy-related 
economic growth. Although the challenges of getting the 
institutions right for tribes are multifaceted, the federal government 
has clearly not lived up to its fiduciary responsibility to manage 
Indian lands for the benefit of tribes and their members. Tribes 
such as the Southern Ute and Salish-Kootenai have demonstrated 
their ability to manage their resources, and other tribes are eager to 
replicate their success. If policymakers continue to relinquish 
control over Indian affairs, tribes could more easily benefit from 
their energy wealth. 
In line with recent efforts to afford more control to tribal 
nations, Congress enacted the Helping Expedite and Advance 
Responsible Tribal Homeownership (HEARTH) Act in 2012.163 
The Act removes many regulatory hurdles for leasing tribal surface 
lands by enabling tribes to create their own leasing regulations and 
requiring the federal government to expedite its approval 
process.164 In short, the Act would allow tribes with leasing plans 
preapproved by the Secretary of the Interior to lease tribal land 
without needing further secretarial approval for each lease.165 
However, the Act does not apply to “traditional” subsurface energy 
resources such as oil, natural gas, and minerals, and thus offers no 
help with the obstacles and delays discussed in this Article.166 
Expanding the HEARTH Act to apply to these traditional forms of 
subsurface energy development, or adopting similar legislation for 
such resources, would address many of these obstacles. 
Like the HEARTH Act for renewable energy development, 
TERA agreements are intended to promote increased tribal 
sovereignty over subsurface energy development. However, as 
discussed earlier, the TERA approval process is still complicated 
by excessive rules and regulations.167 Streamlining the TERA 
approval process to make it a more practical and effective 
alternative for tribes would encourage more tribal self-
determination and sovereignty over development decisions. In 
addition, allowing individual Indian mineral owners to negotiate 
IMDA or TERA agreements—and eliminating many of the steps 
required to process such leases—would reduce similar obstacles 
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faced by individual Indians residing on individual trust (allotted) 
lands.168 
Other policy reforms that would promote tribal sovereignty 
over energy development include repealing the $6,500 fee assessed 
by the BLM for processing each application to drill on Indian lands 
and streamlining the approval process for energy development 
throughout Indian Country.169 In response to pressure from 
Congress and several tribes, the BIA created two “one-stop shops” 
to expedite the complex approval process for leasing Indian lands 
for energy development—one in Farmington, New Mexico for the 
Navajo Reservation, and another in New Town, North Dakota for 
the Fort Berthold Reservation.170 Staffed with personnel from 
multiple agencies, the “shops” are intended to streamline the 
bureaucracy that oversees Indian resource management.171 Thus 
far, the shops appear to be providing a more reliable and consistent 
permitting process for oil and gas companies seeking to contract 
with tribes or individual Indians.172 
Another initiative underway from within Indian Country is the 
adoption of business and commercial laws that promote certainty 
for lenders and other businesses.173 One example used by a 
growing number of tribes is the Model Tribal Secured Transactions 
Act (MTSTA). This model commercial law has enabled tribes to 
harmonize their legal framework for many types of commercial 
transactions with the laws of state and other tribal jurisdictions.174 
This has helped to reduce some of the uncertainty and confusion 
that lenders and investors often face when attempting to do 
business in Indian Country. Tribes that have adopted laws such as 
the MTSTA have done so to help reduce the cost of doing business 
in their jurisdictions and to promote access to capital and credit for 
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their tribal and member-owned businesses.175 Today, however, 
many tribes still lack effective and relevant commercial laws.176 
In Canada, First Nations (the equivalent of tribes in the United 
States) are exploring other policy reforms that address similar 
challenges to those faced by tribes in the United States. The 
proposed First Nation Property Ownership Initiative would give 
First Nations the opportunity to hold full legal title to their lands, 
just like any other Canadian.177 Each First Nation would have the 
option to choose whether to participate in the initiative.178 Those 
that participate would have the power to transfer the legal title to 
individuals while retaining First Nation jurisdiction over the 
land.179 A similar initiative in the United States would have 
dramatic implications for Native American economies, not the 
least of which would be to reduce the authority of the federal 
government over Indian resource development. 
CONCLUSION 
The discussion herein demonstrates that energy resources on 
Indian lands hold the potential for generating significant wealth for 
Native Americans. However, most reservations with energy 
resources have not yet fully capitalized on their energy wealth. Of 
course, tribal self-determination includes the right for tribes to 
choose not to develop their energy wealth, as the Northern 
Cheyenne tribe has done.180 But if institutional constraints such as 
the federal trusteeship over Indian lands, an unstable rule of law, or 
federal regulations prevent tribes from developing their natural 
resources, then it is time to reconsider those institutions. 
A recent report examining energy development on American 
Indian lands stated, “the best way for the government to honor its 
trust obligations is to stop trying to determine what is in the best 
interest of tribes and instead support tribal efforts to make that 
decision autonomously.”181 The report concluded, “[w]hen tribes 
are free to make decisions for themselves, they have the 
opportunity to align policy and planning with tribal priorities.”182 
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Tribes have proven that when they are given the right to manage 
their own resources, they repeatedly demonstrate that they can do 
so in ways that benefit tribal nations and generate broader 
economic growth.183 When tribes are freed from the oversight of 
the federal government, they are able to determine what is best for 
them and engage in economic activities that promote both their 
cultures and their communities.  
The importance of institutions such as property rights and the 
rule of law in promoting economic growth have been demonstrated 
throughout human history, and they appear to be equally important 
for Native American reservations. Despite the fact that reservations 
often contain valuable natural resources, many tribes remain 
locked in a poverty trap. In effect, their land amounts to what de 
Soto referred to as “dead capital”—unable to generate benefits to 
tribes, individual Indians, or the broader economy.184 Policy 
reforms that enable tribes and individual Indians to more easily 
convert their land from “dead capital” into “live capital” are sorely 
needed. As long as tribes are denied the right to own their land and 
control their resources, they will remain locked in poverty and 
dependence. If tribes are afforded the same rights and institutions 
as those living outside of reservations, they would have the 
opportunity to unlock the tremendous wealth of Indian nations. 
 
                                                                                                             
 183. See Berry, supra note 160. 
 184. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM 
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6 (2000). 
       
